Invest or regret? An empirical investigation into funding dynamics during the final days of equity crowdfunding campaigns by Nguyen, Thang et al.
1 
 
Invest or regret? An empirical investigation into funding dynamics during 
the final days of equity crowdfunding campaigns 
 
Thang Nguyen, Coventry University, UK 
Joe Cox, Athabasca University, Canada 





In this study, we use the options theory of investment to investigate the funding behaviour of 
investors in equity crowdfunding. Options theory argues that when faced with uncertainty, 
investors have the ‘option’ to delay their irreversible investments, although incur a cost in doing 
so. Demonstrating that investments in equity crowdfunding are characterised by low levels of 
irreversibility (i.e., they are semi-reversible), moderate cost of delay and high levels of uncertainty, 
we follow the predictions of options theory in hypothesising that investors may rationally delay 
their investments in order to gain new information about the quality of businesses in which they 
invest.  We find empirical evidence in support of these arguments when investigating the dynamics 
of investment activity in campaigns hosted on the UK equity crowdfunding platform Crowdcube. 
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Crowdfunding is a form of disintermediated finance that allows entrepreneurs to raise funds 
directly from large numbers of individual contributors in an online setting (Cumming and Zhang, 
2016; Cumming and Vismara, 2017). Crowdfunding has been rising in prominence partly due to 
its potential to assist the smooth functioning of investment markets by reducing demand 
uncertainty and providing an initial screening of investment opportunities (Strausz, 2017). In a 
wider sense, crowdfunding has also helped to partially address the difficulties faced by 
entrepreneurial firms in accessing finance (Denis, 2004), especially given recent declines in the 
traditional forms of venture capital that previously addressed this gap (Shane and Nicolaou, 2018). 
Crowdfunding has further benefitted from a combination of the global low-interest rate 
environment and developments in Internet technologies (Block et al., 2018), as well as key 
regulatory changes such as Title III of the US JOBS Act, allowing non-accredited investors to 
exchange crowd-sourced capital directly for equity securities (Li and Martin, 2016).  
Despite these benefits, it has been argued that crowdfunding imposes corporate governance costs 
on entrepreneurs due to the dispersed nature of investors, leading to higher agency costs (Drover 
et al., 2017) and separation of ownership from control (Cumming, Meoli and Vismara, 2019). 
Equity crowdfunding may also suffer as a result of pecking order theory, which asserts that 
managers tend to resist the sacrifice of control associated with the sale of equity and prefer to rely 
on internal sources of finance or external debt, in that order (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Entrepreneurial firms may therefore turn to equity crowdfunding only as a last resort when these 
other funding sources are unavailable or have been exhausted (Walthoff-Borm, Schwienbacker 
and Vanacker, 2018). As a consequence of these issues, the use of crowdfunding can be associated 
with both adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as other opportunistic behaviours on the 
part of entrepreneurs (Ahlstrom, Cumming and Vismara, 2018). Hence, crowdfunding is likely to 
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be particularly affected by uncertainty and information asymmetry between investors and 
entrepreneurs.   
We use the options theory of investment posited by Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
as a novel theoretical lens through which to view the funding dynamics of equity crowdfunding 
campaigns over time. Options theory argues that investors who make irreversible investments 
under conditions of imperfect information almost always have the ‘option’ to delay their 
investments, though they will typically incur a cost in doing so. We argue that, due to the relatively 
low cost of delay associated with equity crowdfunding, investors may rationally hold back their 
capital expenditures for as long as possible in order to gather more information and reduce 
uncertainty. The aim of this study is to test these theoretical predictions through undertaking an 
empirical analysis of funding dynamics within a sample of first-come-first-served (FCFS) equity 
crowdfunding campaigns listed on the UK platform Crowdcube. We show that various measures 
of investment activity (i.e., number of investments, average investment amount and the amount 
of capital raised) tend to increase significantly during the final phase of the funding cycle relative 
to the middle period. Consistent with options theory, we also show that the increase in activity we 
observe is particularly pronounced among subsets of campaigns with relatively higher levels of 
uncertainty and lower cost of delay. 
Our study extends the stream of research on funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding. More 
specifically, we argue that the options theory of investment seemingly provides a more consistent 
explanation for the pattern of activity we observe during the final days of funding cycle compared 
with alternative explanations appearing elsewhere in the literature. In our study, we observe a U-
shaped pattern of investment over time, with an associated upturn in funding activity during the 
final few days of fundraising. This pattern of investment is inconsistent with the results of Hornuf 
and Schwienbacher (2018), who find evidence of an ‘L’ shaped pattern among FCFS equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. Additionally, the lack of evidence of a monotonic increase in funding 
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activity over time is at least somewhat inconsistent with the theory of information cascades, which 
is suggested by Vismara (2018) to be a plausible explanation for funding dynamics in equity 
crowdfunding. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the following section, we provide an 
overview of equity crowdfunding and the Crowdcube platform, before critically reviewing a range 
of related studies on entrepreneurial finance and equity crowdfunding in Section 3. On the basis 
of this literature, we outline the options theory of investment in greater detail and propose a series 
of formal research hypotheses in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the context and characteristics 
of our data and method, before presenting our empirical results and robustness checks in Section 
6. Finally, we present a discussion of the implications of our findings in Section 7 along with a 
broad summary and conclusion in Section 8. 
2. Equity Crowdfunding and the Crowdcube Platform 
Crowdfunding involves the establishment of a fundraising campaign by a founder, with the goal 
of meeting a specific monetary target to support a project or activity. Campaigns are typically 
hosted on an intermediary online platform that solicits monetary contributions from large numbers 
of funders. Most crowdfunding campaigns operate on the basis of an all-or-nothing approach, 
meaning that founders only receive the capital raised if their campaign successfully achieves its 
fundraising target within a specified time period, usually 30 days. Additionally, there are a variety 
of competing models of crowdfunding that incentivize contributions in different ways, including 
pure donations, rewards and loan-based models. Our study focuses on the equity crowdfunding 
model, whereby entrepreneurs (founders) attempt to raise money from investors (funders) by 
offering an equity stake in their company. Equity crowdfunding represents something of a hybrid 
between public and private equity, given that investments can be made by members of the public 




We gather data from Crowdcube, the first equity crowdfunding site to launch in the UK and one 
of the largest equity platforms in the world1 (De la Vina and Black, 2017; Walthoff-Borm, 
Schwienbacker and Vanacker, 2018). Although Crowdcube differs somewhat from UK-based 
rivals Seedrs and Syndicate Room,2 it is similar to other large UK platforms in terms of the number 
of hosted campaigns, website traffic and success rates (Walthoff-Borm, Vanacker and Collewaert, 
2017). In addition, the FCFS allocation mechanism used by Crowdcube is common to almost all 
European crowdfunding platforms (Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 2016; Hornuf and Neuenkirch, 
2017), meaning that the underlying incentives driving the dynamics of funding activity over time 
are likely to be quite similar.  By comparison, the auction-based system used by other platforms is 
likely to lead to an even greater incentive to delay investments so as to prevent the signalling of 
private information to other bidders (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2018). We therefore argue that 
the options theory of investment is both relevant and applicable to the leading allocation 
mechanisms employed by equity crowdfunding platforms across Europe, which would make our 
findings generalizable beyond the specific context of Crowdcube. 
In order to conform with Financial Conduct Authority regulations, Crowdcube and other UK 
equity crowdfunding platforms officially operate as passive conduits between entrepreneurs and 
investors.  Otherwise, the platform would be bound by strict rules concerning the sorts of parties 
that may arrange or introduce investors to new investment opportunities (Dehner and Kong, 
2014). According to the Crowdcube website, although they do not provide investment advice or 
an assessment of the quality of the businesses, they do undertake a thorough screening of the 
company, its legal structure and directors 3 to 4 weeks prior to the launch of a campaign. 
                                                          
1 We briefly describe the operation of the platform and highlight the most relevant features to our research. A 
number of previous studies (Vismara, 2018; Vismara, 2017) also provide further information about the platform. 
 
2 Unlike Crowdcube, Seedrs is not a pure equity platform and Syndicate Room requires at least 25% of the target 
amount to have been pre-committed by professional investors. See Signori and Vismara (2018) for further details. 
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Businesses are vetted in this way during the pre-fundraising stage in order to minimise the number 
of low-quality campaigns and reduce information asymmetry (Löher, 2017).    
Once the campaign is launched, Crowdcube encourage entrepreneurs to supply business plans, 
financial forecasts and other documentation in support of the mandatory written funding pitch 
appearing on the campaign page, which is often supplemented with a short promotional video. 
During the campaign, investors can pose questions and share information in public discussion 
forums. Entrepreneurs can also provide updates on the business and campaign using the same 
forums.3 Information regarding the progress of the fundraising campaign, such as the number of 
investors, the accumulated amount of funding raised and the amount of time remaining, is always 
available to potential investors. However, Crowdcube offers relatively little in the way of post-
campaign services such as exit assistance and secondary market services (Rossi and Vismara, 2018) 
and there is no ongoing reporting to the platform required once the campaign has concluded 
(Signori and Vismara, 2018). 
3. Literature Review 
Equity crowdfunding may be regarded as a form of entrepreneurial finance and shares many 
characteristics in common with IPOs. Much of the literature on this topic focuses on the issue of 
uncertainty and the degree of information asymmetry that exists between investors and 
entrepreneurs. Numerous studies have shown that firms can minimise information asymmetry in 
IPOs by providing investors access to greater quantities of more precise information about the 
business (Zhang, 2012), as well as demonstrating credible signals of quality such as retention of 
ownership (Bruton, Chahine and Filatotchev, 2009). The literature also shows that the problem of 
information asymmetry tends to result in initial offerings being under-priced, leading to abnormal 
first-day returns (Bradley et al., 2009). In order to address such problems, third parties such as 
                                                          
3 For further details about campaign updates, refer to Block et al. (2018). 
7 
 
venture capitalists and business angels provide signals of quality that help investors to assess the 
true quality of an investment opportunity (Flor and Grell, 2013), as well as promote higher 
standards of corporate governance (Farag, Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2014). 
Our study aligns with a small number of others in the crowdfunding literature that investigate the 
dynamics of funding for equity crowdfunding campaigns. These studies tend to focus primarily on 
the patterns of funding observed during the early stages of fundraising. For example, Vulkan, 
Astebro and Sierra (2016) investigate UK data and found that campaign performance is largely 
dependent upon attracting investors willing to make larger pledges at an early stage, with early 
stage performance found to improve among campaigns with lower goals and lower amounts of 
equity offered. Petitjean (2018) also show that fundraising performance during the first week of 
fundraising has a strong predictive power for the ultimate performance of the campaign, leading 
the authors to conclude that investors tend to be influenced by the actions by others.   
Taking a more complete view of funding dynamics over the course of the campaign, Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher (2018) compare funding patterns for FCFS and auction-based allocation 
mechanisms. The authors find evidence to suggest that funding patterns for auction-based 
mechanisms tend to be U-shaped over time, as investors withhold their bids until the last minute 
so as not to signal their beliefs about the true value of the business to rival bidders. By contrast, 
the same authors find that the dynamics of campaigns adopting a FCFS mechanism are L-shaped 
over time, implying relatively little activity during the final stages of the campaign. The authors 
suggest that the lack of late investments they observed with respect to FCFS may occur because 
the price of equity remains constant throughout the fundraising period, meaning that investors 
have no incentive to withhold their investments. The study also suggests that the observed pattern 
of funding can be explained by imitation and conformity with others. 
In a closely related study, Vismara (2018) argues that the actions of high-profile investors during 
the early part of the fund-raising cycle may lead to informational cascades. This phenomenon 
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involves investors observing and learning from the actions of others, leading to a form of herding 
behaviour and mimicking leaders (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998). Information 
cascades occur when individuals perceive the information held by leaders and other prior investors 
to be superior to their own privately-held information (Banerjee, 1992; Welch, 1992), but can lead 
to inefficient outcomes in cases where uncertainty is high and/or the information available is noisy 
(Povel et al., 2016). Following this argument, Vismara (2018) show that successful campaigns tend 
to enjoy relatively large investments during the early days of the funding cycle. However, the study 
does not explicitly investigate funding dynamics during the later stages of the funding cycle. By 
focusing on patterns of investment in the final days of fundraising, our study builds on this 
literature and offers a detailed insight into the dynamics of fundraising over the entire campaign 
lifecycle. 
4. Theory and Hypothesis Development 
We analyse the dynamics of equity crowdfunding using the lens of the options theory of 
investment. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that most investments have three important 
characteristics; namely irreversibility, uncertainty, and the possibility of delay. All investments face 
a degree of uncertainty from a number of potential sources, including information asymmetry, 
economic policy, project fundamentals or the motivations of other market participants (Baker, 
Bloom and Davis, 2015; Banerjee and Green, 2015; Stokey, 2016). Investments are also generally 
considered to be at least imperfectly reversible, with some initial costs which are not fully 
recoverable after the investment expenditures are made (McDonald and Siegel, 1986).  
The ability to delay investment can be thought of as being similar to an ‘option’ which offers the 
right—but not the obligation—to make the investment at some future point in time. The main 
benefit of this option is that investors may be able to access more information over time, which 
reduces uncertainty regarding the true quality of the investment opportunity (Pindyck, 1991; Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). However, delaying investment incurs costs and in some instances may even 
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be impossible. For instance, firms making investments may need to arrive at decisions quickly in 
order to deter new market entry or pre-empt competitors’ investments. Considering the cost, delay 
is more rational in cases where the level of uncertainty is likely to fall in the near future (Stokey, 
2016). The core argument of options theory is that uncertainty, irreversibility and the cost of delay 
will affect the timing of investment decisions. Investors, however, need to trade off the various 
cost of delay against the benefits of waiting in order to potentially derive additional information.  
Equity crowdfunding provides a relevant and unique research setting in which to study options 
theory at the level of the investor, rather than at the firm level which is typical of most studies (e.g., 
Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2016). However, the applicability of options theory will 
differ significantly according to the allocation mechanism used by any given crowdfunding 
platform. Under an auction mechanism, equity is not sold until the end of the auction period when 
all bids have been received. By comparison, under the FCFS mechanism, the available equity can 
be sold before the end of the advertised funding period, meaning that the campaign may close 
prematurely. Investors in campaigns using the FCFS mechanism must therefore give careful 
thought to the timing of their contributions. On the one hand, adequate time must be taken to 
perform due diligence and related activities, such as engaging in discussions and receiving updates 
from entrepreneurs. On the other hand, long delays may result in missing out on the investment 
opportunity altogether. This FCFS mechanism is unique in comparison with other investment 
settings such as stock markets, where prices move but investments are mostly reversible and 
investors are in many respects unconstrained regarding the time they can take to invest. We discuss 
below the core aspects of the options theory of investment in the context of equity crowdfunding 





4.1 Low Levels of Irreversibility 
Investments made via Crowdcube are relatively easy to reverse during and immediately following 
the fundraising period. For example, investors can apply to the platform to cancel or reduce their 
investments while the campaign is live, or within seven days after the funding target is met. 
However, investors incur costs as a result of cancelling their investments, both in terms of the 
opportunity cost of time4 and potential sanctions from the platform in the event of numerous 
requests of this nature. However, once the seven-day cooling off period expires, investments in 
equity crowdfunding are almost completely irreversible due to an absence of secondary markets 
(Ahlers et al., 2015). Overall, we suggest that investor behaviour may be more likely to be driven 
by the low-level of investment irreversibility during the fundraising period, as opposed to the high 
level of irreversibility after it has ended. 
4.2 Moderate Cost of Delaying Investments 
Delaying investment is feasible within the framework of FCFS equity crowdfunding up to a point. 
In this context, the effective price of each share is identical for all investors, irrespective of the 
timing of their investment. As such, the decision to delay investment has no bearing upon the 
share price. However, investors are constrained by the time period during which they can make 
investments. Unlike reward-based crowdfunding where founders seek to raise the greatest amount 
possible, entrepreneurs are limited in the amount of capital they can raise, given the estimated 
value of their business and the amount of equity they make available. As such, no further 
investments are permitted once the entrepreneur has raised an amount equal to the value of equity 
on offer. This particular setting therefore imposes a time constraint on investors to make their 
                                                          
4 Investors need to e-mail Crowdcube with their account details and the amount they wish to cancel or withdraw. The 




decisions before the available equity is sold. As a consequence, delayed action may result in missing 
out on the investment opportunity altogether.   
4.3 High Levels of Uncertainty 
Investments in equity crowdfunding are characterised by a high level of uncertainty. Vismara 
(2018) commented that “uncertainty, intrinsic to all entrepreneurial settings, is more severe in 
crowdfunding markets, where projects are typically proposed by first-time entrepreneurs” (p. 5). 
As businesses raising funds using equity crowdfunding are typically small and young, and it is not 
always straightforward for investors to determine the firm’s fundamental value (Ahlers et al., 2015; 
Hervé et al., 2016; and many others). A further potential source of uncertainty is information 
asymmetry between investors and entrepreneurs (Cumming and Groh, 2018). Financial markets 
generally follow a weak form of efficiency whereby prices reflect available information only to the 
point where the marginal benefit of acquiring additional information equals the marginal cost 
(Fama, 1991). Given the importance of information in reducing uncertainty, inefficiencies are more 
likely to occur in situations where the marginal cost of information acquisition is higher, which is 
an issue that particularly affects small businesses. (Fama, 1998). In the absence of complete 
information, inefficiencies can also result from behavioural biases such as overconfidence and self-
attribution (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998).  
In addition to information asymmetry and ambiguity regarding the fundamental value of a given 
business, equity crowdfunding also suffers from outcome uncertainty with respect to achieving 
declared funding goals. Although investors will receive a refund in the event the campaign is 
unsuccessful in meeting its target, such investments still impose a degree of cost; the refund 
process takes time and investors may miss out on other investment opportunities as a result. These 
assumptions are consistent with Baldwin’s (1982) model of non-reversible sequential investments, 
whereby investors are assumed to require a premium on their return to compensate them for the 
opportunity costs associated with making an investment. The Crowdcube platform’s overfunding 
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feature has a bearing on uncertainty; in this special period, entrepreneurs can attempt to raise 
additional capital following the conclusion of their initial campaign.5 However, whether or not a 
campaign will enter into overfunding is uncertain and decided on a case-by-case basis by the 
entrepreneur in conjunction with the platform. It is not known during the initial fundraising period 
which campaigns will enter into overfunding, meaning that investors cannot rely on the 
opportunity to invest during such a period.   
4.4 Research Hypotheses 
The arguments presented above suggest that investments in equity crowdfunding have relatively 
low and fixed levels of irreversibility.  However, the high level of uncertainty suggests that investors 
may rationally elect to exercise the option of delaying their investment. The main benefit of 
exercising such an option is the opportunity to gain additional information about the business in 
order to make a more informed investment decision. However, the decision to delay may also 
impose costs in terms of missed investment opportunities. More importantly, the likelihood of 
missing out on any given investment opportunity will increase during the final days of the 
fundraising period, while the marginal quantity and benefit of additional information will also likely 
decrease.  
As information on progress towards the fundraising goal is publicly available and easily accessible, 
we consider it likely that investors may rationally choose to delay their investment until the amount 
raised is close to the target. We therefore expect that the number of investors contributing toward 
a campaign will increase during the final days of the funding cycle. We further argue that the 
average investment may also increase in size during this period, since those considering investing 
larger sums will have a greater incentive to undertake due diligence. Combined with the larger 
expected number of investors, the higher average pledge expected during the final days of the 
                                                          




fundraising campaign is likely to lead to a larger monetary amount raised in this period. We 
therefore hypothesize that:   
H1: The number of investors, average investment and aggregate daily level of investment will tend to increase as 
campaigns approach the final days of the funding cycle.  
To further determine the extent to which options theory helps to explain the funding dynamics 
observed during the final days of a funding cycle, we investigate how the decision to delay 
investments varies with both the level of uncertainty and cost of delay (Bloom, Bond and Ven 
Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 2009). In line with the predictions of options theory, investors will be more 
likely to delay investing in campaigns with higher levels of uncertainty so they have more time to 
gather information and reduce information asymmetry. Also following options theory, we predict 
that investors will be more likely to delay investment when the cost of doing so is smaller. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
H2: The number of investors, average investment and aggregate daily level of investment during the final days of an 
equity crowdfunding cycle will be relatively larger for campaigns associated with higher levels of uncertainty compared 
with those associated with lower levels of uncertainty.  
H3: The number of investors, average investment and aggregate daily level of investment during the final days of an 
equity crowdfunding cycle will be relatively larger for campaigns associated with lower cost of delay compared with 
those associated with higher cost of delay.  
5. Data and Method 
We use an automated program to scrape daily data for all of the 104 campaigns that commenced 
and concluded on the Crowdcube website between August 2015 and February 2016. A majority 
of our data are collected from information and documentation made available online via each 
campaign webpage. We also supplement this campaign data with information on the exact age of 
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the company based on the records held by Companies House in the UK, calculated according to 
the difference in days between the date of incorporation and the start of the crowdfunding 
campaign. Additionally, we construct a measure of volatility in the wider financial market by 
measuring the standard deviation of FTSE returns over a rolling 30-day window preceding each 
campaign day. 
Due to our use of 10 dummy variables associated with specific days in the funding cycle, we were 
forced to exclude 13 campaigns that were active for a period of fewer than 11 days before achieving 
their funding target. From an absolute total of 104 campaigns, our final sample therefore consists 
of an unbalanced panel of 2,608 daily observations relating to 91 campaigns, with an average of 
around 29 fundraising days observed per campaign.6 Our sample size is closely comparable to that 
used in a number of recent relevant studies of equity crowdfunding. For example, Hornuf and 
Neuenkirch (2017) and Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2018) conducted their analysis on a sample 
of 44 FCFS equity crowdfunding campaigns from Germany.7 While our sample size may be slightly 
smaller than the 132 campaigns used by Vismara (2018), the summary and descriptive statistics 
presented below indicate that the characteristics of the two samples are very similar in most other 
respects.  
5.1 Dependent Variables 
In order to test our research hypotheses, we calculate a number of different measures of daily 
funding activity.  First, following both Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2018) and Vismara (2018), we 
measure daily investment flows in terms of the number of investors contributing funding towards 
the campaign on each day of the funding cycle. We also measure the average size of investment, 
which is simply calculated as the daily amount of capital raised divided by the number of investors 
                                                          
6 The average length of projects in Vismara (2018) was nearly 60 days as this was the standard campaign duration at 
the time his sample was constructed in 2014.  
 
7 The sample used by Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2018) contains 89 campaigns, although 45 of them were from a 
second-price auction platform. 
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recorded on each day. Finally, we follow Block, Hornuf and Moritz (2018) in capturing aggregate 
daily monetary inflows by simply recording the total amount of capital raised on each given day.  
5.2 Independent Variables 
Similar to studies by Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2018); Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2018); and 
Vismara (2018), we include dummy variables reflecting the first and last five days of each campaign. 
First Day (Last Day) takes the value of 1 if it is the first (last) day of funding cycle. The variable First 
Day (B), where B=1,2,3,4 takes the value of 1 exactly B days after the first day, or 0 otherwise. The 
variable Last Day (B), where B=1,2,3,4 takes the value of 1 if a campaign is B days before the last 
day, or 0 otherwise. For instance, Last Day (2) takes the value of 1 if the campaign is 2 days before 
its last day of fundraising and 0 otherwise. In our regression analysis, the coefficients associated 
with these variables are interpreted as the difference of funding flows during these campaign days 
compared with the averages observed during the middle period of the funding cycle, (i.e., outside 
of the first and last five days). Although we do not report the results for the sake of brevity, we 
also run our models with dummy variables for each day of the campaign rather than just the first 
and last five. The pattern of funding we observe in these alternate specifications is consistent with 
the more parsimonious set results presented here, and are available from the authors on request. 
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics and definitions for the variables captured by our dataset. We 
show that campaigns receive an average of just over 4 investments totalling around £8,320 on a 
typical day of fundraising. However, in each case, the mean values of these variables are larger than 
the medians, implying a small number of disproportionately successful campaigns within the 
dataset. Campaigns tend to enjoy a relatively active exchange of information between investors 
and entrepreneurs, with each campaign achieving an aggregate of 54 Facebook shares to-date on 
any given day of the campaign, with around 11 updates having been made by the entrepreneurs 
up to that date. On average, a Crowdcube campaign will compete against approximately 24 other 
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campaigns that are active at the same time, while each day, around 137 investments are made across 
all of the campaigns hosted on the platform.   
<TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics> 
Consistent with Vismara (2018), our dataset also contains a set of campaign-specific variables to 
control for the possibility of selection bias, whereby those campaigns with stronger signals of 
quality attract greater numbers of investors at all stages of the funding cycle. These controls include 
the size of the executive and non-executive management teams (social capital) and whether the 
campaign description makes explicit mention of a patent either awarded or pending (intellectual 
capital), as well as whether the business has achieved positive sales during the previous financial 
year. On average, we show that each business is fronted by a team of just over two executive 
entrepreneurs, supported by a team of just over three non-executive managers. Only around 10% 
of campaigns in the sample make explicit mention of a patent, while almost exactly two-thirds of 
the sample report having achieved positive sales. Other variables suggest that the average business 
has been active for a period of just over three years at the time the campaign is launched.  A 
minority of businesses in the sample are supported by sophisticated investors (angels or VCs) at 
the time of the listing, while a majority have not paid any form of dividend, nor formally anticipate 
an IPO as an exit strategy for investors. 
The properties of our data seem to be largely consistent with other studies of equity crowdfunding 
in the UK. For example, the average equity we observe being sold by each campaign is 12%, which 
is close to the averages of 14% and 16% reported by Vismara (2016) and Walthoff-Borm, 
Schwienbacker and Vanacker (2018), respectively. The average campaign target of £329,000 in our 
dataset is higher than the £144,000 reported by Vismara (2016), but well within the typical range 
of £100,000 to £2,000,000 reported by Estrin, Gozman and Khavul (2018). Given the differences 
in sample period used by these studies, these figures may reflect an increase in the size of campaign 
targets over time. Such a trend is consistent with the findings of Vulkan, Astebro and Sierra (2016), 
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who observed that average funding goals on the rival platform Seedrs have also tended to increase 
over time from £68,000 in 2012 to £200,000 in 2015, with average investment sizes also rising 
from £400 to £1,400 over the same period. The average investment size also shows evidence of 
similar growth over time, with our study showing an average of £1,146 compared with the £2,000 
observed by Estrin, Gozman and Khavul (2018). These same authors also find evidence of a wider 
geographic dispersion of campaigns across the UK over time, which is consistent with the 48% of 
London-based campaigns observed by Vismara (2016) compared with the 31% in our (more 
recent) dataset. Overall, we are satisfied that the properties of our dataset are in line with the level 
and trends observed in other studies using data from Crowdcube and other similar platforms. Our 
empirical results are therefore likely to be reasonably generalisable within the context of equity 
crowdfunding, at least in the UK. 
5.3 Indicators of Uncertainty 
To investigate hypothesis H2, we identify high and low uncertainty campaigns in a number of 
ways. First, the subset of campaigns that enter into an overfunding period are likely to be regarded 
as having lower levels of outcome uncertainty compared with the initial fundraising cycle, given 
that they have already sold the full amount of equity that was initially offered and thus raised the 
necessary funds to fulfil their original investment plans. Following our main argument, investors 
who are concerned by the risk of missing investment opportunities will choose to invest during 
the normal fundraising period. We should therefore expect to observe a relative decline in the 
number of investors and funding amounts during the final days of the overfunding period 
compared with the final days of the initial funding period. Second, we split the campaigns in our 
dataset into two groups on the basis of whether or not the business has recorded positive sales in 
the last accounting year. Businesses that have already generated revenues are likely to be regarded 
by investors as having lower levels of uncertainty, thereby reducing the incentive to delay 
investment. We therefore expect to observe a reduction in the concentration of investors and 
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funding during the final days of these campaigns compared with those businesses with no record 
of positive sales. 
5.4 Indicator of the Cost of Delay 
In investigate hypothesis H3, we further divide the campaigns in our sample according to the likely 
cost of delay faced by potential investors. As argued in previous sections, the major cost associated 
with exercising the option to delay is the risk of missing investment opportunities. However, 
measuring the cost (risk) of missing investment opportunities is challenging, given that individual 
investors will each have different preferences and attitudes regarding risk. In practice, investors 
can assess the risk of missing investment opportunities by monitoring information on funding 
progress, which is publicly visible on the campaign website. Campaigns that are observed to 
approach their funding goals more quickly are likely to be perceived as presenting a higher risk in 
this regard. For example, potential investors in a campaign that achieves its funding goal within 10 
days will generally face a higher risk of missing the investment opportunity compared with 
campaigns that take 30 days to reach their goal. We therefore use the campaign duration as an 
indicator of the cost of delay, assuming that campaigns with longer durations will be associated 
with a lower cost of delay and vice versa.   
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 provides a summary of key descriptive statistics for observations on particular funding 
days at both the beginning and end of the campaign, compared against equivalent descriptive 
statistics for the middle period. In each case, t-statistics are provided to test the statistical 
significance of the difference in means observed between each respective funding day and the 
middle period. The data show the highest levels of activity typically occur on the very first day of 
funding and remain strong during First Day (1) and First Day (2) before declining thereafter. A 
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similar pattern can be observed in reverse during the final days of fundraising, with activity that is 
statistically indistinguishable from the middle of the funding period during Last Day (4) and Last 
Day (3). However, funding activity is shown to increase modestly during Last Day (2) and Last 
Day (1) before increasing sharply on the Last Day. Taken together, these results strongly imply a 
U-shaped funding pattern over time for equity crowdfunding campaigns in our sample. 
<TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics – Data Subsets> 
Examining in greater detail, while the number of investors is seen to increase during a majority of 
both the first and last funding days relative to the middle period, the average investment size and 
amounts raised increase more markedly on the final day. This pattern implies that investors 
pledging larger sums outside of the first three days may typically elect to wait until the final day 
before committing to the campaign. Previous research has shown that funders in the early stages 
of a crowdfunding campaign may be disproportionately likely to be friends or family of the 
founder(s), while funders in the later stages are likely to be strangers (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 
2018). The evidence we present above is consistent with this scenario, given that investors looking 
to pledge larger sums, but lacking any direct ties to the entrepreneur(s), are likely to be affected to 
a greater extent by information asymmetry. Such investors would therefore be more likely to delay 
their investments to the very end of the funding cycle in order to obtain more information. 
Developing these initial results, we present below the results of an extensive multivariate analysis 
in order to test our hypotheses more rigorously. 
6.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Table 3 reports the results from a random-effects panel regression analysis of the temporal 
dynamics of campaign funding cycles. As the dependent variable (number of investors per day) in 
Specification I is a non-negative integer or count variable, we estimate a negative binomial panel 
regression to correct for over-dispersion.  For Specification II, we perform the same analysis using 
GLS panel regression on the natural log of the number of investors, while Specifications III and 
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IV employ the same approach using the natural log of the average investment size and total 
monetary amount raised by a given campaign on a given day, respectively.  In each case, we allow 
for the clustering of bootstrapped or robust standard errors at the campaign level as appropriate. 
<TABLE 3: Funding Dynamics in Equity Crowdfunding (Random Effects)> 
The results presented in Specification I shows that the number of investors tends to be significantly 
higher during the first five days of the campaign. However, investor numbers are also shown to 
increase as the end of the campaign approaches, particularly during the last three days of the 
funding cycle compared with the middle phase. More specifically, Specifications II and I, 
respectively, suggest that campaigns tend to experience an increase of around 98% to 122% in the 
number of investors contributing on the final day relative to the middle phase of the funding cycle. 
The coefficient estimates presented in Specification III suggests that the average amount 
contributed on the final day tends to be around nine times larger during the middle of the 
fundraising cycle, which is the largest difference observed for any day outside of the First Day. 
Correspondingly, it is not surprising to observe in Specification IV that the amount raised on the 
final day tends to be around 14 times higher than during the middle period, implying that investors 
planning to make larger investments may withhold their capital until the very end of funding cycle. 
These results highlight how patterns observed in the aggregate amount of capital raised may be 
influenced to a greater extent by variations in average investment size rather than the number of 
investors.  Altogether, our empirical findings support research hypothesis H1. 
Coefficient estimates for our control variables are comparable with those appearing in prior 
studies. Consistent with Block et al. (2018) and Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2018), we find that 
number of discussions and Facebook shares are positively associated with the number of investors, 
but not with the average size of investment or daily amounts raised. This finding highlights the 
importance of information provided during the funding cycle in terms of attracting a greater 
volume of investors. However, the lack of significance of the same variable in Specification III 
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implies that those investing larger sums do not seem to be as likely to be persuaded to contribute 
in this way. Further, our results show mixed evidence on the effect of increased numbers of 
competing campaigns and investments, implying that a greater volume of investment activity 
across the platform as a whole tends to be associated with greater levels of investment on a given 
day in the fundraising cycle for any individual campaign. We also show that increased stock market 
volatility is associated with larger numbers of investors on a given day, while investor numbers 
tend to be higher on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and over the weekend, relative to Mondays. In each 
case, no strong relationship is observed with the average size of investment or daily amount raised. 
We also find evidence to suggest that campaigns with higher targets, larger management teams and 
positive sales records tend to attract both greater quantities and higher amounts of investment. 
To supplement the above results, we present in Table 4 the results of similar panel regressions 
including campaign fixed-effects and omitting any non-time varying controls. Although not 
reported, we also check for the consistency of these specifications by following the 
recommendations of Allison and Waterman (2002) relating to negative binomial models with 
fixed-effects. We find the results generated by this process to be consistent with those reported by 
the standard fixed-effect panel models. The coefficient estimates reported in Table 4 relating to 
key independent variables are consistent with those appearing in Table 3, which implies that our 
findings are robust to the choice of modelling using fixed or random effects. However, Sargan-
Hansen tests performed on the fixed versus random effects models show that fixed effects are 
preferred to random effects. As such, we report only results using campaign fixed-effects for all 
of the additional modelling presented below. 
<TABLE 4: Funding Dynamics in Equity Crowdfunding (Campaign Fixed-Effects)> 
6.3 High/Low Uncertainty 
While the above analysis generally supports our first research hypothesis, we undertake additional 
analysis to confirm the relevance of options theory by investigating whether the level of uncertainty 
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impacts upon the pattern of campaign funding. First, we investigate funding dynamics in the 
overfunding stage, which we argue is associated with reduced outcome uncertainty relative to 
campaigns in the initial fundraising period. Table 5 replicates the main analysis on the subsample 
of 32 campaigns that enter an overfunding stage for an average of 17 funding days each, leading 
to a total of 559 daily campaign observations. Due to the typically shorter duration of overfunding 
compared with the initial fundraising period, we restrict our main independent variables to capture 
only the first and last three days of overfunding, once again measured relative to the middle period. 
We argue that this approach is reasonable, given that the results we presented earlier show that 
differences in investment activity tend to be most pronounced within three days of the campaign 
start and/or end. Adopting this strategy also allows us to retain the largest possible sample size. 
<TABLE 5: Funding Dynamics – Overfunding Period> 
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that an increase in fundraising activity continues to be 
observed in the first and last days compared with the middle of the overfunding period. However, 
the magnitudes of increases in funding activity observed in the first and last days of the 
overfunding period are relatively smaller than the equivalent measures observed during the regular 
funding stage, and often considerably so. While the coefficient estimates relating to number of 
investors are comparable to those presented in Table 4, the differences are more pronounced in 
terms of the average investment size and amount raised on the final day relative to the middle 
period. The average investment size on the final day of the overfunding period is shown to be 
around four times larger than the middle period, compared with an estimated nine times larger 
during regular fundraising. We also estimate that the aggregate amount raised on the final day of 
overfunding is around eight times larger than in the middle period, compared with an estimated 
14 times larger during regular fundraising. Given that the overfunding period is not guaranteed, 
our results imply that those investing larger sums tend to do so at the end of the regular fundraising 
period rather than risking the opportunity to invest (or not) during the overfunding stage. The 
23 
 
result also implies that investors in equity crowdfunding take into account the risks of missing 
investment opportunities when they time their investments. The smaller magnitude of the upturn 
in investment activity observed in the overfunding period further demonstrates that there tends to 
be a relative reduction in the concentration of funding around the end of this additional funding 
period, which is consistent with options theory due to lower uncertainty and reduced benefit of 
waiting up until the end of the overfunding period to invest.  
In Table 6, we present further analysis of investor behaviour in high and low uncertainty campaigns 
by dividing the data sample according to whether or not the business has recorded positive sales 
in the previous accounting year. We argue that businesses showing evidence of positive sales would 
be regarded as having lower levels of uncertainty and information asymmetry compared with those 
that have not recorded positive sales. For both types of businesses, we again observe an increase 
in funding activity as the campaign reaches its conclusion. However, in common with the results 
from the overfunding stage, we find that the magnitude of the increase in activity relative to the 
middle period is quite different between high and low uncertainty campaigns.   
The results in Table 6 demonstrate that the numbers of funders, average pledges and total amounts 
raised are markedly higher on the final day of fundraising for campaigns with higher uncertainty 
relative to those with low uncertainty. For example, depending on the specification, we estimate 
that the number of investors tends to increase by around 130% to 210% on the final day for high 
uncertainty campaigns (vs. an increase of around 85% to 107% for low uncertainty campaigns), 
while the size of average pledge is around 16 times larger for high uncertainty campaigns (vs. an 
estimated 7 times larger for low uncertainty campaigns). Correspondingly, the total amount raised 
on the final day of the campaign relative to the middle period is estimated to be around 32 times 
larger for high uncertainty campaigns, versus an estimated 10 times larger for low uncertainty 
campaigns. These findings suggest that investors tend to delay their (larger) investments to a 
greater extent when the level of uncertainty is higher, which is again consistent with the prediction 
24 
 
made by options theory. Together with the results from the overfunding stage presented in Table 
5, the evidence we present in this section leads us to accept research hypothesis H2. Therefore, 
our findings suggest that investors in high uncertainty campaigns are more likely than investors in 
low uncertainty campaigns to wait until the very end of the funding period in order to obtain as 
much additional information as possible before investing. 
<TABLE 6: Funding Dynamics – High/Low Uncertainty (Positive Sales)> 
6.4 High/Low Cost of Delay 
In Table 7 we analyse the dynamics of campaigns with high and low cost of delay by dividing the 
data sample according to the total duration of the fundraising period. We argue that those 
campaigns investors see as approaching their funding target more quickly will be interpreted as 
presenting a higher cost of delay, while those that take longer to progress towards their funding 
goal will be interpreted as presenting a lower cost of delay. In both cases, we again observe a U-
shaped funding pattern consistent with the results presented earlier. However, side-by-side 
comparison shows that the increase in activity in the final days relative to the middle period is 
more pronounced among campaigns with a low cost of delay compared with those with a high 
cost of delay.    
More specifically, we show that the number of investors tends to increase by around 137% to 
160% on the final day of campaigns with a low cost of delay (vs. around 70% to 106% for 
campaigns with a high cost of delay). We further show that the size of the average pledge on the 
final day tends to be around 10 times larger for campaigns with a low cost of delay (vs. an estimated 
nine times larger for those with a high cost of delay). Taken together, these estimates explain why 
campaigns with low cost of delay are estimated to raise around 14 times more funds on aggregate 
during the final day (vs. an estimated 20 times more for those with high cost of delay). Consistent 
with options theory, these results suggest that investors tend to delay their (larger) investments to 
a greater extent when the cost of delay is lower. Conversely, investors are shown to be less likely 
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to delay investments until the final day for campaigns that reach their target more quickly (i.e., 
demonstrate a higher cost of delay). Taken together, these findings lead us to accept research 
hypothesis H3. 
<TABLE 7: Funding Dynamics – High/Low Cost of Delay (Total Duration)> 
7. Discussion 
Across all of the models and specifications outlined in the previous section, we show consistent 
evidence of a U-shaped pattern of funding activity over time in terms of the number of investors 
and magnitude of financial contributions to equity crowdfunding campaigns. We find this pattern 
to be consistent within both the full sample as well as sub-samples of campaigns with differing 
levels of uncertainty and cost of delay. We find the overall trends identified by our study to be 
more pronounced among those campaigns with higher levels of uncertainty and with lower cost 
of delay. Essentially, our findings suggest that investments made during the final days of the 
fundraising cycle are similarly important in determining campaign outcomes compared with 
investments made during the first days. The important practical implication is that crowdfunding 
platforms should encourage entrepreneurs to provide additional information in order to reduce 
information asymmetry and encourage into action those investors taking the option to delay their 
investments. However, while the pattern of results across specifications is consistent with the 
predictions of options theory, it is unlikely that this theory alone is sufficient to wholly explain the 
funding dynamics we observe in our data. We discuss each of the other plausible theoretical 
explanations in this section, along with reasons why we feel these alternatives cannot entirely 
replace options theory as a means by which to explain the patterns of funding observed in our 
data.  
One factor that could potentially result in the patterns of funding we observe in this study is 
altruism or a desire to help entrepreneurs meet their targets. This motivation has been suggested 
to be at least somewhat prevalent among reward-based crowdfunding campaigns (Wash, 2013; 
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Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2017). However, we argue that our findings are inconsistent with such 
theories on at least two grounds. First, we suggest there is likely to be a stark difference in 
motivations of funders among different crowdfunding models. Investors in equity crowdfunding 
are likely to be motivated to a greater extent by the possibility of financial returns compared with 
funders of other types of crowdfunding such as reward or donation-based models (Cholakova and 
Clarysse, 2015). Motivation to contribute to these other forms of crowdfunding campaigns 
includes offering support to family members, friends or local businesses; none of which are likely 
to be as prevalent in the context of equity crowdfunding (Baeck, Collins and Zhang, 2014). It is 
therefore unlikely that investments flows increase in the final days of equity crowdfunding 
campaigns because investors behave altruistically. Second, even if investment flows were to 
increase for this reason, it is difficult to explain why this funding pattern appears to be influenced 
by the level of uncertainty and cost of delay.  
Another potential explanation for the pattern of funding we observe is herding behaviour 
(Herzenstein, Dholakia and Andrews, 2011; Zhang and Liu, 2012). However, we argue that 
herding theory is also somewhat inconsistent with the patterns of funding we observe. Indeed, if 
investors merely followed the activities of their peers, we should observe a continuously increasing 
number of investors and amount of money raised during the course of the funding cycle. The fact 
that we do not observe such a trend is indicative that the information cascades might not be as 
important in determining campaign outcomes as claimed by Vismara (2018). Such a finding is not 
entirely without precedent, as information cascades may be fragile and quickly dislodged 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998). Information cascades may also be associated with 
information blockages, which make the choices of previous investors less informative to 
subsequent observers (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). Given the apparent inconsistency with 
information cascade theory, our findings may actually suggest that investors in equity 
crowdfunding are more sophisticated than previously thought and do not simply copy the actions 
of other high-profile investors.   
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The evidence we present also rules out the possibility of procrastination (Roth and Ockenfels, 
2002) wherein individuals tend to delay their decisions despite there being no real advantage in 
doing so. Even if the patterns we observe are caused by procrastinating investors, this does not 
adequately explain why we tend to observe larger investments being made towards the end of the 
funding cycle. Moreover, it is also difficult to explain why these types of investors would be more 
prevalent among campaigns with higher levels of uncertainty or lower cost of delay. Altogether, 
while we cannot claim that the options theory of investment is able to explain the entirety of 
variations in funding activities we observe over time, we suggest it offers the most convincing 
single explanation relative to the alternatives outlined above. 
7.1 Limitations 
Our study is somewhat constrained by a number of limitations. Although we attempt to capture 
all publicly available information from the Crowdcube platform, we are unable to capture data on 
all of the information that might influence investor behaviour. There may be unobserved factors 
that affect our results, despite our use of fixed-effect panel regressions to at least partly mitigate 
the issue of unobserved heterogeneity across individual campaigns. Further, the difference 
between the temporal patterns of funding observed by Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2018) and our 
study may be a consequence of their focus on German equity crowdfunding platforms compared 
with our use of data from the UK. It is therefore possible that the extent to which investor 
behaviour in equity crowdfunding can be explained by the options theory of investment differs 
according to platform or cultural contexts. Further research on the topic is needed to determine 
the validity of this assertion. 
Additionally, our empirical analysis only presents indirect evidence in support of options theory. 
Unfortunately, we do not have complete information on the activities of individual investors, such 
as the time when they begin to take an interest in the business or the amount of time they spend 
undertaking due diligence. It is plausible that, rather than observing the entire fundraising cycle 
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and waiting to invest at the optimal time, investors simply contribute towards a campaign the very 
first time they come across it, without giving the investment such careful thought as we assume in 
this study. While it is possible to interpret our results as evidence of tactical investment in the final 
days before the conclusion of the campaign, we may be observing a purely behavioural 
phenomenon.  Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to test if this is the case. We also lack data 
on the channels through which investors gain information about equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
Further to written updates, entrepreneurs may also organise face-to-face meetings with other 
investors or may initiate contact via other external channels (e.g., social media, e-mail) to share 
information. While we are able to demonstrate that investors who delay their investments tend to 
also invest larger sums, we do not have specific information on the characteristics of any individual 
investor, such as whether they are private or institutional.   
Another concern relates to the potentially endogenous nature of investment flows during the final 
days of the funding cycle and the success or failure of equity crowdfunding campaigns. One may 
argue that investors are disproportionately attracted to campaigns that are close to achieving their 
funding goal, which in itself leads to an increase in funding and a greater likelihood of success. 
While this factor might influence investor behaviour to some extent, it does not explain why the 
increase in investment flows is significantly smaller during the final days of campaigns associated 
with lower levels of uncertainty or higher cost of delay. Altogether, we use all of the information 
realistically available to us and, while our study may suffer from certain limitations, we can find no 
evidence to refute the use of options theory as a means of explaining variation in equity 
crowdfunding investments over time, nor any other explanation that offers an equally convincing 
explanation. 
8. Conclusion 
We contribute to the line of research in equity crowdfunding relating to the dynamics of funding 
patterns and the behaviours of investors. Using the theoretical framework of options theory, we 
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show that a significant proportion of investors tend to make their investments during the final 
days of the funding cycle. We also find that those making larger investments are more likely to 
delay their actions compared with those making smaller investments, and thus appear to be an 
important determinant of campaign success.  
Our extended analysis showing the impacts of both uncertainty and cost of delay on the temporal 
pattern of investments provides further support for options theory, whereby investors are shown 
to delay investments to a greater extent for campaigns that demonstrate higher levels of uncertainty 
and lower cost of delay. We conclude that, because of the relatively high uncertainty and moderate 
cost of delay associated with equity crowdfunding campaigns, investors tend to rationally withhold 
their investment decisions until the final days of the campaign in order to acquire more 
information.  However, once the level of uncertainty diminishes over the course of the fundraising 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Description Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Daily No. of Investors The number of individual investors contributing to a campaign on each day 4.23 2 10.48 0 261.00 
Daily Average Investment The average investment to a campaign on each day (£) 1,146 110 3,479 0 57,153 
Daily Amount Raised The total monetary amount raised by a campaign on each day (£) 8,320 355 46,443 0 1,670,988 
TIME-VARYING CONTROLS 
Facebook A cumulative measure of the number of times the campaign is shared on Facebook 53.79 30 80.64 0 913.00 
Updates A cumulative measure of the number of updates provided by the campaign founders 10.66 9 8.01 0 51.00 
Active Campaigns The aggregate number of active campaigns hosted on the Crowdcube platform on a given date 23.84 25 6.12 6 33.00 
Competing Investors The aggregate number of investments recorded on the Crowdcube platform on a given date 136.76 113 107.58 15 1191.00 
FTSE Volatility The standard deviation of FTSE returns over a rolling 20-day period up to and including a given date 0.013 0.012 0.004 0.006 0.020 
CAMPAIGN-SPECIFIC CONTROLS 
Target The total amount that the founders of the crowdfunding campaign seek to raise (£) 328,681 250,000 333,364 50,000 1,900,000 
Equity Offered The percentage of equity in the business offered by the campaign founders in return for the target sum (%)  12.34 11.12 6.20 2.71 40 
Total Duration The aggregate number of days that the campaign runs 28.66 29 10.25 11 60 
Number of Executives The number of founders/executives mentioned by name in the campaign listing 2.10 2 1.11 1 5 
Size of Management Team Number of non-executive managers or board members mentioned by name in the campaign listing 3.30 3 2.32 2 11 
Company Age The length of time in days between the date of incorporation and the start of the campaign 1100.07 869 956.36 27 5621 
Number of Documents A count of the number of additional documents provided to supplement the campaign listing 2.53 3 1.39 0 5 
Tax Incentive  Dummy variable; =1 if the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) tax relief is available for investors; 0 otherwise 0.15 - - 0 1 
Technology Dummy variable; =1 if the campaign is listed in the technology category; 0 otherwise 0.10 - - 0 1 
Positive Sales Dummy variable; =1 if the financial snapshot shows positive revenue in the previous accounting year; 0 otherwise 0.66 - - 0 1 
Patent Dummy variable; =1 if the campaign listing or documentation mentions a patent (pending); 0 otherwise 0.10 - - 0 1 
IPO Exit Dummy variable; =1 if the campaign listing or documentation states an IPO as the target exit strategy; 0 otherwise 0.27 - - 0 1 
Dividends Dummy variable; =1 if the financial snapshot shows dividends have been paid to shareholders; 0 otherwise 0.05 - - 0 1 
Sophisticated Investors Dummy variable; =1 if the campaign listing or documentation mentions the involvement of an angel or VC; 0 otherwise 0.24 - - 0 1 
London Dummy variable; =1 if the business is based in London; 0 otherwise 0.31 - - 0 1 
Table 1 reports sample descriptive statistics.  Campaign-specific controls are calculated at the campaign-level for a total of 91 campaigns hosted on the UK FCFS equity crowdfunding platform Crowdcube between August 
2015 and March 2016.  Dependent variables and time-varying controls are calculated based on a total of 2,608 daily observations of activity for these 91 campaigns. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Data Subsets 
 Mean t-Stat.  Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
FIRST DAY 
Daily No. of Investors 25.07 5.21 *** 11 40.94 0 261 
Daily Average Investment (£) 4,309 3.63 *** 1,319 8,928 0 55,087 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 88,927 3.78 *** 20,410 214,402 0 1,670,988 
FIRST DAY (1) 
Daily No. of Investors 8.75 4.90 *** 5 11.72 0 93 
Daily Average Investment (£) 1,378 1.48  283 2,967 0 20,113 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 12,036 3.12 *** 2,000 24,755 0 146,990 
FIRST DAY (2) 
Daily No. of Investors 5.09 3.78 *** 3 5.93 0 36 
Daily Average Investment (£) 3,066 2.61 *** 390 7,864 0 57,153 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 11,375 3.08 *** 1,790 23,006 0 171,460 
FIRST DAY (3) 
Daily No. of Investors 4.62 3.19 *** 3 5.62 0 28 
Daily Average Investment (£) 1,140 0.79 283 2,745 0 18,525 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 5,593 1.15 1,030 13,948 0 102,170 
FIRST DAY (4) 
Daily No. of Investors 3.96 2.08 ** 2 5.65 0 37 
Daily Average Investment (£) 642 -1.80 * 117 1,241 0 7,750 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 3,155 -1.06 600 5,904 0 43,170 
MIDDLE PERIOD 
Daily No. of Investors 2.70 -  1 4.61 0 62 
Daily Average Investment 906 -  79 2,763 0 45,055 
Daily Amount Raised 3,877 -  200 11,941 0 173,520 
LAST DAY (4) 
Daily No. of Investors 2.84 0.30 1 4.15 0 27 
Daily Average Investment (£) 644 -1.34 100 1,740 0 11,790 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 3,576 -0.29 120 9,664 0 58,950 
LAST DAY (3) 
Daily No. of Investors 3.21 0.72 1 6.69 0 54 
Daily Average Investment (£) 827 -0.30 125 2,387 0 20,200 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 4,422 0.45 300 11,317 0 78,620 
LAST DAY (2) 
Daily No. of Investors 5.26 2.12 ** 2 11.94 0 102 
Daily Average Investment (£) 1,036 0.62 250 1,890 0 10,250 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 11,550 1.27 720 57,697 0 540,670 
LAST DAY (1) 
Daily No. of Investors 4.16 2.07 ** 2 6.68 0 49 
Daily Average Investment (£) 986 0.30 177 2,473 0 20,030 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 4,898 1.13 500 8,167 0 37,250 
LAST DAY 
Daily No. of Investors 7.84 4.99 *** 5 9.76 0 65 
Daily Average Investment (£) 1,912 2.66 *** 664 3,548 0 21,960 
Daily Amount Raised (£) 20,555 3.94 *** 2,830 40,299 0 263,340 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics based on data for funding observed on selected days for 91 campaigns hosted on the UK 
FCFS equity crowdfunding platform Crowdcube between August 2015 and March 2016. The two-tailed t-tests compare funding 
during each of the first and last five days respectively against the middle funding period, assuming unequal variance. Hypotheses 
of equal means rejected at: ***=99%;  **=95%;  *=90% confidence levels.   
 
 
Table 3: Funding Dynamics of Equity Crowdfunding (Random Effects) 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Daily No. of Investors  
(Negative Binomial) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(GLS) 
Daily Average Investment  
(GLS) 
Daily Amount Raised  
(GLS) 
 Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
First Day 2.402 (0.148) *** 1.752 (0.110) *** 3.069 (0.332) *** 4.560 (0.410) *** 
First Day (1) 1.495 (0.134) *** 1.073 (0.099) *** 1.874 (0.258) *** 2.671 (0.320) *** 
First Day (2) 0.984 (0.124) *** 0.625 (0.079) *** 1.801 (0.295) *** 2.175 (0.329) *** 
First Day (3) 0.890 (0.094) *** 0.561 (0.072) *** 1.395 (0.273) *** 1.703 (0.297) *** 
First Day (4) 0.544 (0.101) *** 0.320 (0.072) *** 0.589 (0.278) ** 0.888 (0.320) *** 
Last Day (4) -0.046 (0.095) -0.018 (0.068) -0.075 (0.257) -0.257 (0.305) 
Last Day (3) -0.069 (0.114) -0.042 (0.069) 0.242 (0.270) 0.273 (0.279) 
Last Day (2) 0.264 (0.094) *** 0.208 (0.068) *** 0.920 (0.246) *** 0.894 (0.265) *** 
Last Day (1) 0.136 (0.087) 0.107 (0.072) 0.426 (0.265) 0.489 (0.312) 
Last Day 0.798 (0.071) *** 0.684 (0.067) *** 2.118 (0.216) *** 2.631 (0.235) *** 
TIME-VARYING CONTROLS 
Ln Facebook 0.073 (0.035) *** 0.068 (0.031) ** 0.071 (0.082) 0.137 (0.104) 
Ln Updates 0.374 (0.071) *** 0.138 (0.052) *** 0.137 (0.170) 0.245 (0.225) 
Ln Active Campaigns -0.570 (0.145) *** -0.381 (0.079) *** -0.098 (0.279) -0.581 (0.363) 
Ln Competing Investors 0.614 (0.052) *** 0.394 (0.037) *** 0.527 (0.131) *** 0.938 (0.159) *** 
Ln FTSE Volatility 0.458 (0.132) *** 0.226 (0.097) ** 0.301 (0.299) 0.502 (0.379) 
DAY OF THE WEEK CONTROLS 
Tuesday 0.184 (0.098) * 0.118 (0.051) ** 0.174 (0.168) 0.237 (0.196) 
Wednesday 0.184 (0.097) * 0.134 (0.049) *** 0.039 (0.181) 0.171 (0.228) 
Thursday 0.125 (0.087) 0.101 (0.053) * 0.140 (0.179) 0.232 (0.197) 
Friday 0.133 (0.090) 0.062 (0.051) -0.051 (0.193) 0.087 (0.209) 
Saturday 0.130 (0.085) 0.106 (0.052) ** 0.077 (0.178) 0.183 (0.209) 
Sunday 0.195 (0.087) ** 0.130 (0.050) *** 0.039 (0.185) 0.080 (0.216) 
CAMPAIGN-SPECIFIC CONTROLS 
Ln Target 0.046 (0.137) 0.343 (0.077) *** 0.830 (0.191) *** 1.079 (0.246) *** 
Ln Equity Offered -0.042 (0.149) -0.085 (0.103) 0.024 (0.280) -0.052 (0.389) 
Ln Total Duration -0.465 (0.282) * -0.232 (0.140) * 0.073 (0.399) -0.164 (0.514) 
Ln Number of Executives -0.157 (0.285) 0.094 (0.157) -0.105 (0.393) -0.014 (0.527) 
Ln Size of Management Team 0.108 (0.154) 0.163 (0.078) ** 0.477 (0.228) ** 0.627 (0.292) ** 
Ln Company Age 0.154 (0.145) -0.002 (0.060) -0.006 (0.137) -0.022 (0.186) 
Ln Number of Documents 0.082 (0.190) 0.007 (0.113) 0.153 (0.312) 0.125 (0.414) 
Tax Incentive  0.214 (0.267) 0.262 (0.113) ** 0.250 (0.415) 0.479 (0.520) 
Technology  0.036 (0.239) -0.072 (0.122) 0.372 (0.332) 0.318 (0.414) 
Positive Sales  0.072 (0.250) 0.293 (0.119) ** 0.707 (0.342) ** 1.033 (0.445) ** 
Patent  0.059 (0.308) 0.078 (0.201) 0.137 (0.648) 0.371 (0.812) 
IPO Exit  -0.138 (0.244) -0.125 (0.115) -0.657 (0.284) ** -0.652 (0.388) * 
Dividends  0.176 (0.557) 0.074 (0.197) 0.412 (0.499) 0.614 (0.700) 
Sophisticated Investors  -0.219 (0.292) -0.103 (0.134) -0.119 (0.370) -0.218 (0.481) 
London  0.024 (0.237) -0.021 (0.110) -0.327 (0.307) -0.293 (0.402) 
Constant Term -0.279 (2.082) -3.008 (1.127) *** -9.183 (3.300) *** -10.733 (4.249) ** 
Wald Chi-Squared 3569.23.470 *** 2157.800 *** 85.760 *** 1580.390 *** 
Log Likelihood / R2 -5552.501 0.354 0.173  0.232  
Table 3 reports funding dynamics based on 2,608 daily observations from 91 campaigns hosted on the UK FCFS equity crowdfunding platform Crowdcube 
between August 2015 and March 2016. Key independent variables are day dummies. First Day (Last Day) takes value of 1 if it is the first (last) day of 
funding cycle. First Day (B), where B=1;2;3;4 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days after the first day of funding cycle. Last Day (B), where B=1;2;3;4 
take value of 1 if a campaign is B days before the last day. Ln Facebook is the logarithm of Facebook as defined in Table 1. Ln Updates, Ln Active 
Campaigns, Ln Competing Investors, Ln  FTSE Volatility, Ln Target, Ln Equity Offered, Ln Total Duration, Ln Number of Executives, Ln Size of 
Management Team, Ln Company Age and Ln Number of Documents are defined similar to Ln Facebook.  Tuesday takes value of 1 if the campaign-day 
observation is Tuesday and 0 otherwise. Other day of the week variables are defined similarly. All other control variables are defined in Table 1. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at campaign level. ***, ** and *, indicate significance of parameter estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 




Table 4: Funding Dynamics of Equity Crowdfunding (Fixed Effects) 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Daily No. of Investors  
(Negative Binomial) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(GLS) 
Daily Average Investment  
(GLS) 
Daily Amount Raised  
(GLS) 
 Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
First Day  2.441 (0.115) *** 1.736 (0.120) *** 2.771 (0.373) *** 4.242 (0.465) *** 
First Day (1) 1.531 (0.104) *** 1.067 (0.102) *** 1.677 (0.278) *** 2.460 (0.341) *** 
First Day (2) 1.039 (0.082) *** 0.621 (0.079) *** 1.645 (0.309) *** 2.007 (0.348) *** 
First Day (3) 0.944 (0.077) *** 0.559 (0.074) *** 1.277 (0.282) *** 1.574 (0.308) *** 
First Day (4) 0.579 (0.097) *** 0.317 (0.073) *** 0.490 (0.275) * 0.780 (0.315) ** 
Last Day (4) -0.019 (0.097) -0.019 (0.069) -0.031 (0.259) -0.215 (0.307) 
Last Day (3) -0.059 (0.098) -0.044 (0.069) 0.287 (0.270) 0.317 (0.281) 
Last Day (2) 0.265 (0.094) *** 0.205 (0.067) *** 0.967 (0.243) *** 0.940 (0.262) *** 
Last Day (1) 0.168 (0.107) 0.104 (0.072) 0.482 (0.270) * 0.543 (0.316) * 
Last Day  0.831 (0.087) *** 0.680 (0.067) *** 2.178 (0.220) *** 2.688 (0.240) *** 
TIME-VARYING CONTROLS 
Ln Facebook 0.061 (0.036) * 0.063 (0.040) 0.031 (0.097) 0.112 (0.126) 
Ln Updates 0.395 (0.062) *** 0.134 (0.060) ** 0.000 (0.230) 0.077 (0.283) 
Ln Active Campaigns -0.520 (0.121) *** -0.391 (0.082) *** -0.224 (0.283) -0.748 (0.369) ** 
Ln Competing Investors 0.611 (0.052) *** 0.400 (0.037) *** 0.573 (0.133) *** 0.982 (0.162) *** 
Ln FTSE Volatility 0.433 (0.138) *** 0.260 (0.115) ** 0.327 (0.382) 0.530 (0.472) 
DAY OF THE WEEK CONTROLS 
Tuesday 0.195 (0.087) ** 0.118 (0.051) ** 0.178 (0.168) 0.241 (0.195) 
Wednesday 0.195 (0.081) ** 0.133 (0.049) *** 0.044 (0.180) 0.173 (0.227) 
Thursday 0.142 (0.083) * 0.100 (0.053) * 0.141 (0.178) 0.232 (0.196) 
Friday 0.145 (0.084) * 0.064 (0.051) -0.031 (0.192) 0.108 (0.209) 
Saturday 0.148 (0.085) * 0.108 (0.052) ** 0.102 (0.176) 0.209 (0.208) 
Sunday 0.209 (0.075) *** 0.133 (0.050) *** 0.057 (0.185) 0.097 (0.215) 
Constant Term -0.410 (0.847) 0.794 (0.553) 3.085 (1.678) * 4.118 (2.075) ** 
Chi-Squared / F 2540.980 *** 59.300 *** 21.830 *** 45.160 *** 
Log Likelihood / R2 -5053.969 0.236 0.078 0.120 
Table 4 reports funding dynamics based on 2,608 daily observations from 91 campaigns hosted on the UK FCFS equity crowdfunding 
platform Crowdcube between August 2015 and March 2016. Key independent variables are day dummies. First Day (Last Day) takes 
value of 1 if it is the first (last) day of funding cycle. First Day (B), where B=1;2;3;4 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days after the first 
day of funding cycle. Last Day (B), where B=1;2;3;4 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days before the last day. All other variables are 
defined in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at campaign level. ***, ** and *, indicate significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Chi-Squared and Log Likelihood are reported in Model I, F-Values and Adjusted R2 
are reported in Models II-IV. 
  
Table 5: Funding Dynamics - Overfunding Period 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Daily No. of Investors  
(Negative Binomial) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(GLS) 
Daily Average Investment  
(GLS) 
Daily Amount Raised  
(GLS) 
 Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
First Day  1.123 (0.094) *** 1.007 (0.111) *** 2.131 (0.233) *** 2.900 (0.232) *** 
First Day (1) 0.289 (0.221) 0.221 (0.183) 0.307 (0.418) 0.676 (0.336) * 
First Day (2) 0.363 (0.109) *** 0.276 (0.127) ** 0.667 (0.359) * 0.531 (0.369) 
Last Day (2) 0.312 (0.158) ** 0.324 (0.143) ** 0.470 (0.330) 0.661 (0.345) * 
Last Day (1) 0.606 (0.097) *** 0.642 (0.089) *** 0.767 (0.252) *** 1.090 (0.271) *** 
Last Day  0.735 (0.107) *** 0.832 (0.123) *** 1.497 (0.247) *** 2.051 (0.270) *** 
TIME-VARYING CONTROLS 
Ln Facebook 0.015 (0.043) 0.001 (0.032) 0.014 (0.075) 0.023 (0.088) 
Ln Updates 0.470 (0.274) * 0.117 (0.275) -0.117 (0.702) -0.104 (0.664) 
Ln Active Campaigns -0.953 (0.274) *** -0.333 (0.180) * 1.030 (0.826) 0.624 (0.641) 
Ln Competing Investors 0.602 (0.098) *** 0.602 (0.107) *** 0.320 (0.251) 0.777 (0.290) ** 
Ln FTSE Volatility 0.238 (0.265) -0.117 (0.275) 0.255 (0.604) 0.245 (0.491) 
DAY OF THE WEEK CONTROLS 
Tuesday -0.058 (0.099) -0.107 (0.101) -0.400 (0.314) -0.309 (0.239) 
Wednesday -0.029 (0.106) -0.011 (0.112) -0.236 (0.229) -0.327 (0.260) 
Thursday 0.044 (0.092) 0.028 (0.117) 0.136 (0.205) 0.016 (0.282) 
Friday 0.097 (0.095) 0.089 (0.115) -0.114 (0.334) -0.071 (0.352) 
Saturday 0.101 (0.109) 0.061 (0.134) -0.320 (0.210) -0.194 (0.283) 
Sunday 0.097 (0.092) 0.065 (0.125) -0.258 (0.337) -0.004 (0.318) 
Constant Term 0.422 (1.775) -0.862 (1.541) 2.388 (3.329) 3.311 (2.585) 
Chi-Squared / F 7290.220 *** 200.69 *** 70.920 *** 500.710 *** 
Log Likelihood / R2 -1511.000 0.256 0.042 0.121 
Table 5 reports funding dynamics based on 559 daily observations from 32 campaigns hosted on the UK FCFS equity crowdfunding 
platform Crowdcube between August 2015 and March 2016. Key independent variables are day dummies. First Day (Last Day) takes 
value of 1 if it is the first (last) day of funding cycle. First Day (B), where B=1;2 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days after the first day 
of funding cycle. Last Day (B), where B=1;2 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days before the last day. All other variables are defined in 
Table 3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at campaign level. ***, ** and *, indicate significance of parameter estimates at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Chi-Squared and Log Likelihood are reported in Model I, F-Values and Adjusted R2 are reported 
in Models II-IV. 
 
 
Table 6: Funding Dynamics – High/Low Uncertainty (Positive Sales) 
 
TABLE 6A: LOW UNCERTAINTY - POSITIVE SALES  
(60 CAMPAIGNS; 1,712 OBSERVATIONS) 
TABLE 6B: HIGH UNCERTAINTY - NO POSITIVE SALES  
(31 CAMPAIGNS; 896 OBSERVATIONS) 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII 
 Daily No. of Investors  
(Negative Binomial) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(GLS) 
Daily Average Investment  
(GLS) 
Daily Amount Raised  
(GLS) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(Negative Binomial) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(GLS) 
Daily Average Investment  
(GLS) 
Daily Amount Raised  
(GLS) 
 Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
First Day  2.225 (0.126) *** 1.668 (0.143) *** 2.585 (0.462) *** 3.989 (0.594) *** 2.514 (0.312) *** 1.758 (0.212) *** 2.826 (0.542) *** 4.328 (0.648) *** 
First Day (1) 1.338 (0.135) *** 1.017 (0.133) *** 1.435 (0.356) *** 2.201 (0.446) *** 1.770 (0.170) *** 1.091 (0.145) *** 1.964 (0.438) *** 2.698 (0.485) *** 
First Day (2) 0.944 (0.107) *** 0.639 (0.095) *** 1.575 (0.371) *** 1.933 (0.427) *** 1.075 (0.215) *** 0.539 (0.138) *** 1.649 (0.579) *** 1.952 (0.630) *** 
First Day (3) 0.806 (0.086) *** 0.540 (0.091) *** 0.912 (0.330) *** 1.244 (0.352) *** 1.078 (0.193) *** 0.538 (0.128) *** 1.778 (0.523) *** 1.954 (0.577) *** 
First Day (4) 0.518 (0.106) *** 0.321 (0.097) *** 0.650 (0.357) * 0.737 (0.409) * 0.637 (0.197) *** 0.264 (0.098) ** 0.066 (0.395) 0.681 (0.490) 
Last Day (4) -0.005 (0.121) -0.032 (0.093) -0.249 (0.348) -0.506 (0.406) -0.038 (0.170) 0.023 (0.093) 0.361 (0.383) 0.368 (0.459) 
Last Day (3) -0.127 (0.117) -0.088 (0.087) 0.165 (0.311) 0.246 (0.325) 0.132 (0.164) 0.070 (0.108) 0.567 (0.508) 0.536 (0.536) 
Last Day (2) 0.251 (0.114) ** 0.211 (0.090) ** 0.808 (0.279) *** 0.808 (0.293) *** 0.320 (0.167) * 0.215 (0.083) ** 1.357 (0.461) *** 1.305 (0.503) ** 
Last Day (1) 0.161 (0.135) 0.133 (0.096) 0.566 (0.329) * 0.560 (0.385) 0.232 (0.170) 0.073 (0.102) 0.361 (0.461) 0.570 (0.527) 
Last Day  0.728 (0.091) *** 0.616 (0.085) *** 1.897 (0.271) *** 2.323 (0.293) *** 1.131 (0.149) *** 0.827 (0.108) *** 2.771 (0.361) *** 3.465 (0.383) *** 
TIME-VARYING CONTROLS 
Ln Facebook 0.015 (0.042) 0.017 (0.052) -0.134 (0.115) -0.047 (0.155) 0.117 (0.069) * 0.110 (0.055) * 0.255 (0.184) 0.274 (0.232) 
Ln Updates 0.401 (0.067) 0.198 (0.071) *** 0.167 (0.256) 0.255 (0.324) 0.240 (0.152) 0.007 (0.081) -0.287 (0.363) -0.262 (0.402) 
Ln Active Campaigns -0.705 (0.141) *** -0.620 (0.100) *** -0.846 (0.370) ** -1.698 (0.467) *** -0.201 (0.248) -0.080 (0.114) 0.621 (0.315) * 0.532 (0.398) 
Ln Competing Investors 0.572 (0.068) *** 0.419 (0.048) *** 0.466 (0.166) *** 0.901 (0.202) *** 0.744 (0.084) *** 0.359 (0.063) *** 0.756 (0.219) *** 1.108 (0.270) *** 
Ln FTSE Volatility 0.331 (0.138) ** 0.231 (0.137) * -0.030 (0.476) 0.151 (0.569) 0.513 (0.200) *** 0.358 (0.157) ** 1.170 (0.459) ** 1.501 (0.594) ** 
DAY OF THE WEEK CONTROLS 
Tuesday 0.156 (0.105) 0.105 (0.070) 0.071 (0.204) 0.163 (0.257) 0.301 (0.147) ** 0.138 (0.064) ** 0.406 (0.301) 0.403 (0.286) 
Wednesday 0.173 (0.078) ** 0.148 (0.065) ** 0.066 (0.215) 0.228 (0.300) 0.260 (0.118) ** 0.098 (0.072) -0.025 (0.346) 0.040 (0.343) 
Thursday 0.117 (0.087) 0.091 (0.074) 0.066 (0.216) 0.174 (0.253) 0.269 (0.121) ** 0.121 (0.065) * 0.279 (0.333) 0.349 (0.312) 
Friday 0.085 (0.084) 0.030 (0.066) -0.133 (0.227) 0.006 (0.247) 0.327 (0.142) ** 0.127 (0.078) 0.159 (0.385) 0.304 (0.400) 
Saturday 0.130 (0.081) 0.123 (0.065) * 0.212 (0.210) 0.274 (0.260) 0.283 (0.131) ** 0.083 (0.085) -0.060 (0.345) 0.127 (0.372) 
Sunday 0.169 (0.077) ** 0.124 (0.062) ** 0.091 (0.216) 0.110 (0.263) 0.393 (0.153) *** 0.147 (0.089) 0.012 (0.355) 0.088 (0.381) 
Constant 0.083 (0.873) 1.453 (0.640) ** 4.574 (2.047) ** 6.531 (2.389) *** -1.568 (1.459) 0.261 (0.733) 2.229 (1.954) 2.741 (2.893) 
Chi-Squared / F 1477.800 *** 43.170 *** 13.910 *** 29.730 *** 1322.050 *** 282.540 *** 50.850 *** 46.940 *** 
Log Likelihood / R2 -3674.093 0.198 0.060 0.100 -1353.107 0.379  0.167  0.219 
Table 6 reports funding dynamics based on 2,608 daily observations from 91 campaigns hosted on the UK FCFS equity crowdfunding platform Crowdcube between August 2015 and March 2016. Key 
independent variables are day dummies. First Day (Last Day) takes value of 1 if it is the first (last) day of funding cycle. First Day (B), where B=1;2;3;4 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days after the first day of 
funding cycle. Last Day (B), where B=1;2;3;4 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days before the last day. All other variables are defined in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at campaign 
level. ***, ** and *, indicate significance of parameter estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Chi-Squared and Log Likelihood are reported in Models I & V, F-Values and Adjusted R2 are reported 
in Models II-IV & VI-VIII. 
 
Table 7: Funding Dynamics – High/Low Cost of Delay (Total Duration) 
 
TABLE 7A: LOW COST OF DELAY – TOTAL DURATION > MEDIAN 
(45 CAMPAIGNS; 1,556 OBSERVATIONS) 
TABLE 7B: HIGH COST OF DELAY – TOTAL DURATION ≤ MEDIAN  
(46 CAMPAIGNS; 1,052 OBSERVATIONS) 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII 
 Daily No. of Investors  
(Negative Binomial) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(GLS) 
Daily Average Investment  
(GLS) 
Daily Amount Raised  
(GLS) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(Negative Binomial) 
Daily No. of Investors  
(GLS) 
Daily Average Investment  
(GLS) 
Daily Amount Raised  
(GLS) 
 Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
First Day  2.295 (0.191) *** 1.740 (0.144) *** 2.610 (0.510) *** 4.073 (0.654) *** 2.300 (0.342) *** 1.503 (0.208) *** 1.984 (0.546) *** 3.275 (0.652) *** 
First Day (1) 1.361 (0.154) *** 0.982 (0.151) *** 1.081 (0.377) *** 1.763 (0.472) *** 1.578 (0.213) *** 0.998 (0.139) *** 1.638 (0.369) *** 2.421 (0.427) *** 
First Day (2) 0.954 (0.140) *** 0.623 (0.098) *** 1.848 (0.435) *** 2.153 (0.478) *** 1.013 (0.192) *** 0.513 (0.125) *** 0.951 (0.417) ** 1.312 (0.465) *** 
First Day (3) 0.958 (0.116) *** 0.612 (0.113) *** 0.855 (0.382) ** 1.275 (0.403) *** 0.828 (0.143) *** 0.422 (0.095) *** 1.354 (0.420) *** 1.473 (0.456) *** 
First Day (4) 0.397 (0.129) *** 0.188 (0.109) * 0.329 (0.407) 0.458 (0.457)  0.684 (0.143) *** 0.363 (0.094) *** 0.377 (0.389)  0.782 (0.473)  
Last Day (4) 0.005 (0.110) -0.010 (0.091) 0.161 (0.356) -0.128 (0.422)  -0.039 (0.209)  -0.015 (0.106)  -0.095 (0.379)  -0.168 (0.444)  
Last Day (3) 0.000 (0.131) 0.000 (0.097) 0.389 (0.348) 0.402 (0.366)  -0.110 (0.157)  -0.077 (0.102)  0.356 (0.421)  0.419 (0.439)  
Last Day (2) 0.318 (0.098) *** 0.297 (0.095) *** 0.879 (0.275) *** 0.968 (0.322) *** 0.275 (0.158) * 0.151 (0.090) * 1.210 (0.391) *** 1.083 (0.398) *** 
Last Day (1) 0.381 (0.149) *** 0.309 (0.111) *** 0.597 (0.346) * 0.905 (0.421) ** -0.101 (0.167)  -0.070 (0.088)  0.562 (0.413)  0.415 (0.463)  
Last Day  0.955 (0.084) *** 0.864 (0.096) *** 2.348 (0.302) *** 2.977 (0.377) *** 0.721 (0.119) *** 0.530 (0.090) *** 2.235 (0.311) *** 2.635 (0.294) *** 
TIME-VARYING CONTROLS 
Ln Facebook 0.037 (0.051) 0.074 (0.050) 0.035 (0.134) 0.163 (0.170)  0.083 (0.060)  -0.001 (0.063)  -0.174 (0.159)  -0.237 (0.208)  
Ln Updates 0.382 (0.084) *** 0.136 (0.072) * 0.099 (0.266) 0.123 (0.344)  0.215 (0.169)  0.031 (0.092)  -0.609 (0.377)  -0.477 (0.405)  
Ln Active Campaigns -0.528 (0.175) *** -0.449 (0.098) *** -0.439 (0.350) -1.090 (0.466) ** -0.686 (0.218) *** -0.252 (0.161)  0.296 (0.618)  0.109 (0.658)  
Ln Competing Investors 0.530 (0.055) *** 0.394 (0.047) *** 0.468 (0.181) ** 0.848 (0.218) *** 0.811 (0.096) *** 0.406 (0.061) *** 0.741 (0.188) *** 1.187 (0.235) *** 
Ln FTSE Volatility 0.320 (0.147) ** 0.110 (0.144) -0.272 (0.467) -0.316 (0.567)  0.590 (0.225) *** 0.388 (0.146) ** 0.650 (0.569)  1.145 (0.632) * 
DAY OF THE WEEK CONTROLS 
Tuesday 0.192 (0.079) ** 0.115 (0.064) * 0.012 (0.208) 0.111 (0.236)  0.143 (0.144)  0.102 (0.085)  0.358 (0.288)  0.337 (0.342)  
Wednesday 0.179 (0.080) ** 0.130 (0.064) ** -0.073 (0.231) 0.154 (0.309)  0.190 (0.126)  0.121 (0.077)  0.198 (0.291)  0.167 (0.331)  
Thursday 0.215 (0.100) ** 0.148 (0.072) ** -0.005 (0.204) 0.158 (0.239)  -0.008 (0.137)  0.023 (0.078)  0.327 (0.326)  0.306 (0.340)  
Friday 0.140 (0.090) 0.064 (0.072) -0.057 (0.275) 0.203 (0.281)  0.135 (0.105)  0.065 (0.072)  0.030 (0.258)  -0.020 (0.311)  
Saturday 0.198 (0.077) ** 0.121 (0.066) * 0.054 (0.214) 0.265 (0.267)  0.059 (0.104)  0.080 (0.083)  0.172 (0.311)  0.112 (0.339)  
Sunday 0.268 (0.077) *** 0.156 (0.065) ** -0.049 (0.222) 0.082 (0.269)  0.074 (0.097)  0.091 (0.078)  0.229 (0.314)  0.133 (0.360)  
Constant -0.399 (0.863) 0.393 (0.698) 1.887 (2.106) 2.355 (2.593) 0.353 (1.388) 1.166 (0.847) 3.154 (3.659) 4.508 (4.052) 
Chi-Squared / F 953.97 *** 51.85 *** 19.50 *** 40.59 *** 1049.37 *** 44.42 *** 16.86 *** 26.14 *** 
Log Likelihood / R2 -3265.14 0.24 0.08 0.11 -1758.12 0.23  0.06  0.09 
Table 7 reports funding dynamics based on 2,608 daily observations from 91 campaigns hosted on the UK FCFS equity crowdfunding platform Crowdcube between August 2015 and March 2016. Key 
independent variables are day dummies. First Day (Last Day) takes value of 1 if it is the first (last) day of funding cycle. First Day (B), where B=1;2;3;4 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days after the first day of 
funding cycle. Last Day (B), where B=1;2;3;4 take value of 1 if a campaign is B days before the last day. All other variables are defined in Table 3. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at 
campaign level. ***, ** and *, indicate significance of parameter estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Chi-Squared and Log Likelihood are reported in Models I & V, F-Values and Adjusted R2 
are reported in Models II-IV & VI-VIII. 
 
